KYC files, beneficial ownership, screening results: the most sensitive data in the financial centre. Our position is that it should be hosted and processed in the Principality, not with a provider built on a US cloud. Here is why, and what it takes.
The great leaks of the past decade came from law firms and service providers, rarely from banks. In a financial centre with so many high-profile clients, a leak of that kind would be a shock. The story of a scenario — a hypothetical one.
In a small financial centre, several institutions end up with the same provider — and, beneath it, the same hyperscaler. Each manages its own risk; nobody sees the concentration.
DORA now applies to Monaco's financial institutions through the Monetary Agreement with the EU. The risk is turning it into a documentation project rather than a stress test.
The information entrusted to Monaco's financial centre is one of its most valuable assets. Its gradual dispersal to foreign providers raises a question that goes beyond any single institution.
Due diligence covers every client. That does not mean every client must be handed, permanently, to a provider hosted abroad. The case for screening in Monaco and sending only the alerts.
Infrastructure in Switzerland or the UK does not, on its own, guarantee legal independence from the United States. The real question is legal, technical and operational control of the data.
The CLOUD Act does not grant automatic access to data. But it makes the server's address irrelevant when the provider is American. What the text says, what FISA 702 adds, what is left of the Patriot Act — and the questions to ask.
An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.