A · Digital sovereignty / Essay

Could Monaco lose control of its information assets?

The information entrusted to Monaco's financial centre is one of its most valuable assets. Its gradual dispersal to foreign providers raises a question that goes beyond any single institution.

People talk readily about Monaco's property, its financial wealth, its cultural heritage. Rarely about what might be called its information assets.

What we mean

Everything the firms in the financial centre know about their clients: who they are, what they own, how it is structured, who they do business with. This information belongs to no bank in particular. It was entrusted to Monaco because Monaco inspired trust. Its value rests on that collective trust.

A dispersal nobody decided

Online email, SaaS management software, screening tools, document platforms, analytics: each migration was studied, justified and approved. None was unreasonable. Added together, they produce an outcome nobody chose. A growing share of what the financial centre knows about its clients now lives outside the Principality, with firms subject to other laws — often, at the end of the chain, US law.

Three ways to lose control

Through law. Data held by a US provider can be the subject of demands under the CLOUD Act or FISA Section 702, which expressly targets non-US persons abroad. In other words, the financial centre's clients.

Through technology. A misconfiguration, a compromised administrator account at a provider, and data leaves without any Monaco bank having done anything wrong.

Through economics. When the whole financial centre depends on a few global providers, it has little left to negotiate. A price change, a discontinued product, a vendor bought by a foreign group: you follow.

Why it concerns the whole financial centre

No single institution sees the overall exposure. Ten banks can depend on the same provider without knowing it. The risk only appears once dependencies are added up.

What could be done

Classify data by sensitivity and keep the most sensitive — KYC, beneficial ownership, structures — on solutions operated in Monaco, with access and keys controlled by the bank. Build, confidentially and in compliance with competition law, an aggregated map of the financial centre's critical dependencies. And make the existence of trusted services operated in the Principality a matter for the financial centre as a whole, rather than a sum of individual choices.

Monaco will not lose control of its information assets in a day. The risk is that it notices only when it is too late to turn back.

References

Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.

  1. Monaco Law No. 1.565 of 3 December 2024 on personal data protection — legimonaco.mc
  2. Personal Data Protection Authority (APDP), Monaco — www.apdp.mc
  3. 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (CLOUD Act); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (FISA Section 702) — www.law.cornell.edu
  4. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Article 29 — eur-lex.europa.eu
  5. Financial Stability Board, Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight – A toolkit, December 2023 — www.fsb.org

A · Digital sovereignty2 min

Regulatory compliance is not digital sovereignty.

An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.

A · Digital sovereignty4 min

Compliance data should stay in Monaco.

KYC files, beneficial ownership, screening results: the most sensitive data in the financial centre. Our position is that it should be hosted and processed in the Principality, not with a provider built on a US cloud. Here is why, and what it takes.