C · Subcontracting chains / Analysis

Cascading subcontracting: the risk nobody sees.

The direct provider is assessed. Its own subcontractors rarely are. Beyond the first tier visibility disappears, while access rights multiply.

The bank chose a vendor. The vendor chose a host. The host uses one company for operations and another for night-time support. Four companies may have access to the data. The bank knows one of them.

What a chain looks like

A typical subcontracting chain The bank contracts with a SaaS vendor (tier 1), which uses a cloud provider (tier 2), which relies on operations and support subcontractors (tier 3). The bank's visibility falls at each tier while potential access grows. BankCustomer SaaS vendorTier 1 · contract CloudTier 2 · hosting Tier 3 · operations Tier 3 · support BANK'S VISIBILITY ↓ POTENTIAL ACCESS ↑
Schematic. Actual structures vary from one service to another.

Why nothing is visible

The bank has a contract only with the first link. Its rights over the others depend on what that first link negotiated — which, facing a hyperscaler, is very little. Subcontractor lists are published online and change on notice. Certifications cover “all services”. And a mid-sized Monaco institution carries little weight at the negotiating table.

The longer and more international the chain, the more these effects add up. A provider operating in Monaco on its own infrastructure has, by construction, a shorter chain that is easier to verify.

What incidents show

What the rules say

Taking back control

The DORA register is a good opportunity to do this work — as long as it does not stop at tier one.

References

Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.

  1. European Banking Authority, Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements, EBA/GL/2019/02, section 13.1 — www.eba.europa.eu
  2. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 28 to 30 — eur-lex.europa.eu
  3. Financial Stability Board, Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight – A toolkit, 4 December 2023 — www.fsb.org
  4. Monaco Law No. 1.565 of 3 December 2024 on personal data protection — legimonaco.mc
  5. National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer) — nvd.nist.gov

A · Digital sovereignty2 min

Regulatory compliance is not digital sovereignty.

An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.

D · Foreign jurisdictions2 min

Bank data hosted in Switzerland — but controlled by whom?

Infrastructure in Switzerland or the UK does not, on its own, guarantee legal independence from the United States. The real question is legal, technical and operational control of the data.