F · Systemic and reputational risk / Forward-looking analysis

The risk of a shared technology dependency in Monaco's financial centre.

In a small financial centre, several institutions end up with the same provider — and, beneath it, the same hyperscaler. Each manages its own risk; nobody sees the concentration.

On the morning of 19 July 2024, airports, hospitals and banks around the world discovered they had a supplier in common. Nobody had been attacked. A faulty update was enough.

How concentration builds up

A financial centre the size of Monaco supports only a limited number of specialist providers. Banks, asset managers and family offices often end up with the same ones: the same core-banking vendor, the same managed-service firm, the same screening service. And beneath them, a handful of US hyperscalers.

Each choice, taken alone, is defensible: you pick the most proven provider, the one your peers already use. That is exactly what creates the shared point of failure.

What precedents show

Monaco was not specifically targeted. But these episodes show how a single shared link can reach hundreds of organisations at once, none of which did anything wrong.

A financial-centre scenario

The consequences would go beyond any single firm: services down at several houses on the same day, perhaps data exfiltrated, clients calling, then questioning the financial centre itself. For a jurisdiction working to consolidate its reputation since it was placed, in June 2024, on the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring (status to be checked on fatf-gafi.org), the timing would be poor.

What can be done

In each institution: identify the providers whose failure would be critical and those likely to be shared with others; build continuity plans that do not rely on the provider they are meant to replace; require vendors to give assurances on the security of their update pipeline.

Across the financial centre: an aggregated, confidential map of dependencies, a joint crisis exercise, prepared communications. And some thought about diversification: providers operating in Monaco, on Monegasque infrastructure, would reduce both concentration on a few global players and exposure to foreign law.

References

Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.

  1. Financial Stability Board, Enhancing Third-Party Risk Management and Oversight – A toolkit, 4 December 2023 — www.fsb.org
  2. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Article 29 and Articles 31 to 44 — eur-lex.europa.eu
  3. CISA, alert on the widespread IT outage following a CrowdStrike update, 19 July 2024 — www.cisa.gov
  4. National Vulnerability Database, CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer) — nvd.nist.gov
  5. FATF, Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring — www.fatf-gafi.org

F · Systemic and reputational risk3 min

“Monaco Gate”: the scenario of a mass leak at the intermediaries.

The great leaks of the past decade came from law firms and service providers, rarely from banks. In a financial centre with so many high-profile clients, a leak of that kind would be a shock. The story of a scenario — a hypothetical one.

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Regulatory compliance is not digital sovereignty.

An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.