A · Digital sovereignty / In-depth analysis

Regulatory compliance is not digital sovereignty.

An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.

Ask a head of compliance where their screening tool is hosted. They will say “Ireland” or “Switzerland”, and they will be right. Then ask who can log into it at night, from which country, with what rights. The answer will take days, if it comes at all.

Two questions that look alike

Compliance asks whether the institution follows the rules that apply to it. Sovereignty asks whether it can control its data, verify what it is told, and take back control if needed. The first is answered with documents. The second requires capabilities.

A complete outsourcing file — contract, security schedules, provider certification, impact assessment — satisfies the first. It can leave the second entirely unanswered.

The data centre's address

It is the most frequently asked question, and the one that says least. A service can be hosted in Frankfurt by a subsidiary of a US group, administered from India and monitored from the United States. The CLOUD Act, to name just one law, looks at the provider holding the data, not where the data sleeps.

The certificate

A certification shows that controls were assessed, over a given scope and period. It does not say which law applies, who the subcontractors are, or whether exit is possible. How many institutions have read the list of systems actually covered by the report they were given?

The clause

An audit right subject to three months' notice and billed at full rate is not an audit right. An exit plan never tested is an intention. A subcontractor list changeable by simple notice commits the provider to very little.

What you should be able to show

From claim to proof
The claimWhat you should be able to show
“The data is in Europe.”The sites, backups included, and the identity of the operator and its parent.
“The provider is certified.”The certificate's exact scope, and how it maps to the service used.
“Everything is encrypted.”Who holds the keys, and when the provider can read the data.
“We can exit.”The date and outcome of the last exit test.

DORA, which applies to Monaco's institutions since the Monetary Agreement was updated in May 2025, points the same way: it asks not just for policies but for tests, usable registers and exit strategies. Provided, of course, that DORA itself does not become another paperwork exercise.

A bank that cannot say who is able to read its client files is not in breach for that reason. It is exposed.

References

Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.

  1. Monaco Law No. 1.565 of 3 December 2024 on personal data protection, Journal de Monaco, 13 December 2024 — legimonaco.mc
  2. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 of 14 December 2022 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (DORA) — eur-lex.europa.eu
  3. ACPR, FAQ on the DORA directive and regulation (applicability to Monegasque institutions) — acpr.banque-france.fr
  4. European Banking Authority, Guidelines on outsourcing arrangements, EBA/GL/2019/02 — www.eba.europa.eu
  5. ANSSI, SecNumCloud requirements framework, version 3.2 — cyber.gouv.fr
  6. 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (CLOUD Act) — www.law.cornell.edu

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Could Monaco lose control of its information assets?

The information entrusted to Monaco's financial centre is one of its most valuable assets. Its gradual dispersal to foreign providers raises a question that goes beyond any single institution.

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Compliance data should stay in Monaco.

KYC files, beneficial ownership, screening results: the most sensitive data in the financial centre. Our position is that it should be hosted and processed in the Principality, not with a provider built on a US cloud. Here is why, and what it takes.