A · Digital sovereignty / Position paper
Compliance data should stay in Monaco.
KYC files, beneficial ownership, screening results: the most sensitive data in the financial centre. Our position is that it should be hosted and processed in the Principality, not with a provider built on a US cloud. Here is why, and what it takes.
This is not a legal requirement. No law prevents a Monaco bank from entrusting its screening to a London vendor hosted on Amazon Web Services. It is a choice. We think it is the wrong one.
Why this data
A bank statement reveals transactions. A KYC file reveals a person: their full identity, their family, their companies, the origin of their wealth, sometimes their political roles. Multiply that by a clientele like Monaco's and you have the most valuable — and most dangerous — thing a financial centre holds. The leaks that made history — Panama, Paradise, Pandora — were about precisely this kind of information.
The legal argument
Amazon Web Services, Microsoft and Google are US companies providing remote computing services. The CLOUD Act requires them to produce data they hold or control, wherever it is stored, when a US legal process demands it. FISA Section 702 allows their assistance to be compelled in targeting non-US persons located abroad.
Neither grants automatic access. But a Monaco bank's clients are, by definition, non-US persons outside the United States. That is the population Section 702 was designed to target. Whether a vendor is British, Swiss or French changes nothing if its servers belong to one of these providers and that provider can read the data.
The provider does the work, the bank answers for it
Outsourcing screening therefore transfers neither the obligation nor the risk. If KYC files leak at the provider, or a foreign authority obtains them, it is not the vendor that clients, the APDP, the AMSF or the press will question. It is the bank, and its board, that will have to explain why the data was there.
“But everything is encrypted”
Often, yes. The question is who holds the keys. In most SaaS compliance offerings, keys are managed by the vendor using the cloud provider's own key-management services, and the service has to decrypt the data anyway to check it against the lists. Encryption whose keys the bank does not hold protects it against a stolen disk. Not against a demand made to whoever runs the service.
The financial-centre argument
When several institutions send their files to the same provider, and several providers rely on the same hyperscaler, a single breach or a single legal demand reaches a large share of Monaco's clientele. DORA, now applicable to the financial centre, requires this concentration risk to be assessed. Assessing it honestly leads to reducing it.
The objections, taken seriously
“Hyperscalers are more secure than a local data centre.” On technical security, that is often true. But the question here is not only resisting an attacker; it is which law you place yourself under and who can be compelled to hand over the data. An excellent safe whose key a third party can demand is still a safe open to that third party.
“The big providers' sovereign offerings solve the problem.” Some are run by local entities with strong commitments. Whether they can shield data from US law while remaining part of a US group is debated among lawyers. They deserve case-by-case scrutiny, contract in hand.
“There is no equivalent in Monaco.” Supply follows demand. And for screening, the model that keeps the engine in Monaco and sends only alerts is available today, as we show in our article on AML outsourcing.
“It will cost more.” Perhaps. The cost of a leak of Monaco KYC files appears in no budget.
In practice
For each compliance provider, record the actual host and its nationality, who holds the keys and how many clients are sent. Classify KYC and beneficial-ownership data at the highest sensitivity level. At the next renewal, include at least one solution operated in Monaco in the tender. And have the final choice approved by the board, knowingly.
References
Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (CLOUD Act) — www.law.cornell.edu
- 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (FISA Section 702) — www.law.cornell.edu
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 28 and 29; ACPR, DORA FAQ (EU–Monaco Monetary Agreement of 20 May 2025) — eur-lex.europa.eu
- Monaco Law No. 1.565 of 3 December 2024 on personal data protection — legimonaco.mc
- Monaco Law No. 1.362 of 3 August 2009, as amended — legimonaco.mc
- ICIJ, Panama Papers, Paradise Papers, Pandora Papers — www.icij.org