B · Bank outsourcing / Technical and legal analysis

AML outsourcing: why send all your client data, all the time?

Due diligence covers every client. That does not mean every client must be handed, permanently, to a provider hosted abroad. The case for screening in Monaco and sending only the alerts.

Monday morning at a Monaco bank. The overnight file has gone to the screening provider: twelve thousand clients, with dates of birth, nationalities and beneficial owners. Forty alerts will come back. Thirty-eight will be namesakes.

What the law requires

The law sets an outcome: every client must be checked against the applicable lists and subject to appropriate due diligence. It does not say where that screening must take place. As far as we know, no text requires it to be done by a provider rather than within the bank's own environment. The choice belongs to the institution, and so does the responsibility: DORA (Article 28) reiterates that a financial entity remains fully responsible when it uses a provider. That choice must also take another principle into account: minimisation.

The default model

Most SaaS screening services work the same way. The bank sends its entire base; the provider checks it continuously against sanctions lists, politically exposed persons and the press. It is simple, quick to deploy, and the lists are always up to date.

But the provider then holds a complete copy of the portfolio. If its service runs on a US cloud, that copy sits with a provider subject to the CLOUD Act and FISA Section 702. If the same provider serves several firms in Monaco, it concentrates a large share of the financial centre's clientele. And a single intrusion is enough to expose all of it.

The other architecture

In the Monday-morning example, it is no longer twelve thousand files leaving the Principality, but two.

Two models
Send everythingScreen in Monaco
What leavesThe portfolioThe alerts
Exposure in a leakTotalA few files
Exposure to foreign lawTotal if the host is foreignLimited to the cases sent
Effort for the bankLowHigher

The objections

They are real. Someone has to run a matching engine and tune its thresholds; settings that are too strict will miss matches, which would be worse than the original problem. Sanctions lists change fast and must be integrated without delay. And adverse-media searches necessarily involve sending a name to an outside source — those searches can be limited to the cases that justify them, with no retention.

None of this is beyond a Monaco bank, alone or pooling resources with others. Providers able to run this kind of screening from Monaco exist or can emerge — precisely if the demand is there.

Minimisation is not optional

References

Sources consulted as of the update date shown. Texts may have changed since; only the official version in force is authoritative.

  1. Monaco Law No. 1.362 of 3 August 2009 on combating money laundering, terrorist financing and corruption, as amended — legimonaco.mc
  2. Monaco Law No. 1.565 of 3 December 2024 on personal data protection — legimonaco.mc
  3. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 5(1)(c) and Article 25 — eur-lex.europa.eu
  4. Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Article 28 — eur-lex.europa.eu
  5. FATF Recommendations — www.fatf-gafi.org

A · Digital sovereignty2 min

Regulatory compliance is not digital sovereignty.

An institution can have every document in order and still not know who administers its systems, from where, and under which law. That gap is rarely measured.

D · Foreign jurisdictions2 min

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Infrastructure in Switzerland or the UK does not, on its own, guarantee legal independence from the United States. The real question is legal, technical and operational control of the data.